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It has long been recognized that a local hidden-variable theory of quantum mechanics can in principle be constructed, provided one is willing to countenance pre-measurement correlations between the properties of measured systems and measuring devices. However, this “conspiratorial” approach is typically dismissed out of hand. In this paper I examine the justification for dismissing conspiracy theories of quantum mechanics. I consider the existing arguments against such theories, and find them to be less than conclusive. I suggest a more powerful argument against the leading strategy for constructing a conspiracy theory. Finally, I outline two alternative strategies for constructing conspiracy theories, both of which are immune to these arguments, but require one to either modify or reject the common cause principle.
1. Introduction
The hidden-variable approach to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics is promising, but also highly problematic. It is promising because certain aspects of the quantum mechanical formalism naturally lend themselves to an epistemic interpretation, and hidden-variable theories endorse such an interpretation.​[1]​ But it is problematic because Bell’s theorem shows that any hidden-variable theory must be non-local, and non-local theories (arguably) conflict with special relativity. There is, however, a loophole in Bell’s theorem; it is possible to construct a local hidden-variable theory if one is willing to accept that systems which (apparently) have not interacted may nevertheless be correlated. This possibility is frequently recognized, but seldom taken seriously. The reason is not hard to see; the existence of such correlations appears to require some kind of universal conspiracy behind the observed phenomena. Consequently, I will call such theories conspiracy theories of quantum mechanics.
The goal of this paper is to give conspiracy theories of quantum mechanics a fair hearing. Perhaps because of their intuitive implausibility, conspiracy theories are usually dismissed with a cursory argument, if indeed they are mentioned at all. But intuitive implausibility is hardly a knockdown argument against a theory, especially in the realm of quantum mechanics. In fact, I contend that none of the arguments against conspiracy theories in the literature are decisive. However, I think that a decisive argument can be constructed, at least against the obvious strategy for constructing conspiracy theories.
The obvious strategy is the one that gives conspiracy theories their name; it involves postulating a vast, hidden mechanism whereby systems that apparently have no common past may nevertheless have interacted. This is what most authors have in mind when they argue against conspiracy theories, and hence this is the explicit target of the existing arguments. I consider each of these arguments in turn, and show how a defender of conspiracy theories could rebut them. I then develop a new line of argument against this strategy, which is a variant of the “measurement problem” argument often used against collapse theories of quantum mechanics.
To a certain extent, then, my arguments are aimed at providing a better rationale for an assumption that physicists and philosophers have been making all along, namely that hidden-mechanism conspiracy theories are untenable. However, my thesis here is not entirely negative; I hope also to suggest directions for future research by providing an assessment of two widely overlooked alternatives strategies for constructing conspiracy theories. The first strategy, developed in the work of Huw Price, exploits the fact that even though the correlated systems in question do not interact in the past, they do interact in the future. If one is prepared to admit backwards causation, one can appeal to the future interaction to explain the correlation. The second strategy, suggested by Bas van Fraassen and Arthur Fine, is to deny the need for any causal explanation of the correlation at all. Instead, the correlation is just a brute fact about the arrangements of events that are allowed in our world.
Both strategies are able to avoid the arguments leveled against the hidden-mechanism strategy, including my measurement problem argument. However, both strategies are also philosophically radical, in that they violate the common cause principle, construed as the principle that every correlation can be explained in terms of a past cause that is common to both events. The first strategy denies that the cause need be in the past, and the second denies that there need be any cause at all. Pursuing either of these strategies would require a significant rethinking of our received views concerning causation and explanation, but at least there is some conceptual space remaining in which to construct a hidden-variable theory of quantum mechanics.
To set the stage for these arguments and to introduce the terminology I will use, I first need to rehearse some familiar material. Section 2 provides a brief sketch of the foundational problems of quantum mechanics, and section 3 provides an outline of the hidden-variable strategy for addressing these problems.
2. The Incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics
The standard theory of quantum mechanics is widely (but far from universally) regarded as incomplete, and hence in need of supplementing, either with new dynamical laws or with new representational machinery. Since this paper concerns a particular strategy for “completing” quantum mechanics, it will be useful to begin by rehearsing the usual arguments that quantum mechanics requires such completion.
These arguments refer to the fact that, on the standard interpretation, quantum mechanics does not assign values to all the properties of a system. Standard quantum mechanics represents the state of a system by a wavefunction in a configuration space, or equivalently, by a vector in a Hilbert space. Properties like the position or spin of a particle are represented by operators on the state. According to the standard way of interpreting states—the eigenstate-eigenvalue link—a system has a determinate value for a given property if and only if its state is an eigenstate of the corresponding operator. So if the state of the system is not an eigenstate of the relevant operator, then the system simply does not have a value for this property. Furthermore, the dynamics by which the state evolves over time—the Schrödinger equation—entails that states are practically never eigenstates of any interesting operators. This means, for example, that particles practically never have positions. The incompleteness of quantum mechanics follows because we know from experience that particles do generally have positions—at the very least, they have positions whenever we observe them.
	Granted, then, that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete, how could we complete it? One traditional strategy is to supplement the Schrödinger dynamics by which the state evolves with a collapse mechanism. The most straightforward collapse theory says that exactly when a measurement occurs on a system, the state jumps instantaneously and stochastically to one of the eigenstates of the operator corresponding to the observable being measured, thereby ensuring that the system has a determinate value for the measured quantity (von Neumann 1932, 186). The probability of a jump to a particular eigenstate is given by the square of its coefficient when the state is written as a weighted sum of the operator’s eigenstates.
	For example, the spin of a spin-1/2 particle (relative to some arbitrary axis) can take two values, “up” and “down”; hence the operator for spin has two eigenstates, which can be written  and . If the state of the particle is the superposition state 2-1/2( + ), then it has no spin value. However, when the spin of a particle in this latter state is measured, its state jumps instantaneously to one or other eigenstate, with equal probabilities, and hence the particle acquires an spin value. Furthermore, a measurement on one particle may affect the state of another particle. For example, suppose that two particles, L and R, are prepared in the entangled state
2-1/2(LR​ – LR)​					(1)
In this case, the measurement on particle L causes its state to jump to one of its spin eigenstates, L or L​, with equal probabilities. But because of the entanglement, the jump also takes particle R to one of its spin eigenstates, R​ or R respectively. Hence the measurement of spin on particle L causes both particles to acquire spin values, where those values are perfectly anti-correlated.
The collapse mechanism completes quantum mechanics, in that it ensures that measurements have outcomes, but it suffers from at least two major problems. The first problem is that measurement plays a dynamical role in the collapse theory; whether a system obeys the Schrödinger dynamics or the collapse dynamics depends on whether or not it undergoes a measurement. However, we have good reason to believe that there is no such distinction in nature; the physical processes that constitute measurement interactions are equally involved in non-measurement interactions. But in that case, measurement cannot play the required role, and the collapse dynamics is ill-founded. This is the measurement problem.​[2]​ The second problem for the collapse mechanism is that it incorporates instantaneous action at a distance. For state (1), the measurement on particle L instantaneously causes particle R to acquire a spin value, no matter how widely separated the particles. That is, the collapse mechanism is non-local.
Several divergent research programs have arisen in response to these problems. One approach, based on the work of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986), aims to construct a local collapse mechanism that makes no mention of measurement. A more radical (and more popular) approach, following Everett (1957), attempts to avoid the problems by denying that standard quantum mechanics is in need of completion. But neither of these approaches will be pursued here, since my concern is an alternative strategy for completing quantum mechanics—the hidden-variable approach. This is not to say that the hidden-variable approach is necessarily superior to the others, but only that my goal in this paper is to see how much headway towards solving the foundational problems of quantum mechanics can be made using this strategy.
3. Hidden Variables
The hidden-variable approach to the incompleteness of quantum mechanics differs from the collapse approach in that the dynamics by which the state evolves over time is not supplemented by a collapse mechanism, and hence the state is generally not an eigenstate of any interesting operators. Instead, extra variables are added to the representation of the system, whose values are the property values possessed by the system. That is, the eigenstate-eigenvalue link is rejected; a system may have a value for a given property even when its state is not an eigenstate of the corresponding operator.
	It might appear to be a simple matter to complete quantum mechanics using a hidden-variable theory. After all, it looks like all that is required is to specify a value for every property of the system. Unfortunately, though, Bell’s theorem (Bell 1964) shows that, given some plausible assumptions, it is impossible to do so without violating the well-confirmed statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.​[3]​ Bell’s theorem is based on the experimental arrangement depicted in the space-time diagram of figure 1. Two particles are prepared at S in state (1), and they travel in opposite directions to ML and MR, where their spins are measured. (The dashed lines are the forward and backward light cones of event S.) The measuring devices work by passing the particles through a magnetic field oriented in the x-direction; if the particle is spin-up it is deflected upwards, and if it is spin-down it is deflected downwards. Each particle then hits a phosphorescent screen, where its deflection can be observed. Furthermore, the magnets can be rotated around the paths of the particles so as to measure spin in directions other than the x-direction. In particular, each device can be set to measure spin along one of three axes 120º apart; the devices are set to one of the three possible directions at DL and DR respectively. Quantum mechanics predicts (and experiment confirms) the following:
(a)	When the two measuring devices are aligned along the same axis, they never produce the same result.
(b)	 When the two measuring devices are aligned along different axes they produce the same result on average 75% of the time.
I will refer to (a) and (b) collectively as the Bell correlations. The task facing the advocate of hidden variables, then, is to assign a value to the spin of each particle along each axis so as to satisfy the Bell correlations.
Bell’s theorem shows that this task is impossible. However, it does not rule out hidden-variable theories once and for all, since the theorem rests on two crucial physical assumptions. The first assumption, Locality, says that the result of a measurement performed on one particle cannot influence the hidden variable values assigned to the other particle. The second assumption, Independence, says that the hidden variables assigned to the particles are independent of the settings of the measuring devices. So the import of Bell’s theorem, properly understood, is that any hidden-variable theory must violate Locality or Independence.
The most celebrated hidden-variable theory is Bohm’s theory (Bohm 1952). Bohm supplements the quantum state with a set of values for the positions of all the particles in the system, and postulates a new dynamical law governing the evolution of these values. As an illustration of the theory, consider how it accounts for the perfect anti-correlation of x-spin measurement results on the entangled state (1). Bohm’s theory does not directly assign spin values to systems; instead, the spins of the two particles are reflected in their positions after deflection by the magnetic fields, and the positions are determined by the Bohmian dynamical law. But according to this law, the velocity of a particle at a time may depend on the positions of other particles at that time. Suppose, for example, that the spin of particle L is measured slightly before that of particle R; when L begins to move under the influence of the magnetic field, the change in L’s position affects the motion of R. The net effect is that if L moves up, then R moves down, even though R may have moved up if the measurement on R had been performed first (Barrett 1999, 140–142). Hence there is a straightforward sense in which the measurement on the left directly affects the outcome on the right.
	One might worry whether Bohm’s hidden-variable theory is any improvement over the collapse theory considered at the end of the previous section. After all, the Bohmian account of the correlations between the spin values makes reference to measurement; the measurement on L affects the outcome for R. Didn’t the reference to measurement in the case of the collapse theory give rise to the measurement problem? However, in the Bohmian case the reference to measurement is eliminable. The dynamics of Bohm’s theory makes no reference to measurement, but only to the wavefunction and to the position values of the particles. One could equally well say that the position of particle L affects the position of particle R, where these positions are connected via laws that apply universally, to measurements and non-measurements alike. Hence Bohm’s theory does not suffer from the measurement problem.​[4]​
	But there is a sense in which Bohm’s theory is not an improvement over the collapse account, and that is that they both violate Locality. Indeed, it is precisely the violation of Locality that allows Bohm’s theory to avoid the force of Bell’s theorem; the measurements on the left affect the outcomes on the right so as to produce the required correlations. As noted above, the trajectories of the particles in Bohm’s theory can depend on the time order of the measurement events ML and MR. But ML and MR are spacelike separated events, and special relativity tells us that such events have no preferred time order. Hence Bohm’s theory, as it stands, is inconsistent with special relativity, and it is hard to see how any other non-local hidden-variable theory could do better.​[5]​
So it looks like the hidden-variable strategy for completing quantum mechanics is in trouble. Bell’s theorem shows that any hidden-variable theory that satisfies Locality and Independence will fail to yield the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, predictions that have been confirmed by experiment. Bohm shows how to construct a non-local hidden-variable theory that yields the right statistical predictions, but Bohm’s theory violates special relativity, which is also well-confirmed by experiment. However, there is another remaining possibility; in principle, at least, an empirically adequate local hidden-variable theory should be available if we are willing to violate Independence. The goal of this paper is to explore this neglected option.
4. Hidden-Mechanism Conspiracy Theories
Suppose, then, that we consider hidden-variable theories that violate Independence; these are the conspiracy theories of quantum mechanics. Recall that Independence is the assumption that the hidden variables assigned to the particles are independent of the settings of the measuring devices. If Independence is violated, then a local hidden-variable theory can in principle account for the Bell correlations. But how could Independence be violated? The common cause principle tells us that every systematic correlation between events is due to a cause that they share. It is a trivial consequence of this that systems that have not interacted cannot be systematically correlated, and all appearances indicate that the particles and the measuring devices do not interact before the measurement.
So it looks like the only way to generate a violation of Independence is to postulate a mechanism whereby the particles and the measuring devices do interact before the measurement, despite the appearances to the contrary. The basic idea is that this hidden mechanism allows signals to pass between the particles and the devices, in advance of the measurements, correlating the spin values of the particles with the measurements that will be performed on them. In this way, no superluminal signaling is required to get the measurements on the two particles to agree or disagree with the right frequencies. This is, of course, just a sketch of a theory; no explicit form for the hidden mechanism has been proposed. But even without a detailed theory, most commentators think that this strategy can be ruled out on general considerations.
Indeed, it is not hard to see the difficulties involved in constructing a local mechanism that can correlate the properties of the particles with the settings of the measuring devices. A look at figure 1 shows that a direct causal interaction between the particles and the measuring devices is ruled out. The simplest mechanism would be one whereby the particle production event S directly affects the device setting events DL and DR, or vice versa. But since these events are all spacelike separated, no local mechanism connecting them is possible. Neither is it possible for the device-setting events to affect the hidden variables of the particles in flight; the entire flight of particle L is spacelike separated from event DR, and similarly for R and DL. It looks like it might be possible for event S to affect the measuring devices between the setting events and the measuring events, since a signal along the light cone from S reaches the devices before the particles do. However, the possibility of resetting the devices via such a mechanism is precluded by the fact that one can use photons as the particles in Bell-type experiments.​[6]​ Since photons travel along the light cone, this leaves no time between the arrival of the signal and the arrival of the particle in which to reset the devices.
So given the experimental arrangement, a direct causal interaction between the particles and the measuring devices cannot be invoked to explain the correlations between their properties. To explain the correlations, then, we need to invoke a common cause—some event in the common past of S, ML and MR that causally influences all three of them. This circumvents the need for superluminal signals, but the hidden-mechanism theory remains problematic. The problem is that the theory requires that whatever physical procedure we use to fix the settings of the measuring devices, that procedure turns out to be causally linked with the hidden variables of the particles. If we use computers to set the devices, then the internal states of the computers are causally linked to the particle properties. If the devices are set manually, then the brain states of the scientists are causally linked to the particle properties. Whatever lengths we go to to try to set the devices using a procedure that is independent of the properties of the particles, our attempt fails. Thus the immediate difficulty with the hidden-mechanism proposal is that it looks like such a mechanism involves the world in a vast conspiracy, incorporating anything that could possibly be used to fix the settings of the measuring devices.
	Perhaps not surprisingly, these conspiracy theories have received little attention in the literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics; where the possibility of denying Independence is mentioned at all, it is usually dismissed out of hand. But given the alternatives, this dismissal requires a more substantive argument. Locality is underwritten by a well-confirmed physical theory, but Independence has no immediately obvious theoretical backing. The denial of Independence is prima facie implausible, but this by itself is not an argument, especially in the realm of fundamental physics. So if the conspiratorial route to a hidden-variable theory is to be blocked, we need to spell out what, precisely, is wrong with postulating a hidden mechanism of the kind sketched above.
5. Existing arguments against hidden mechanisms
To this end, let us consider the few explicit arguments against conspiracy theories in the literature. First, Bell notes rather cryptically, that the settings of the measuring devices could be determined “at the whim of the experimenters” (Bell 1976, 23), and several commentators take him to be objecting to conspiracy theories on the basis of human free will (Shimony, Horne and Clauser 1976, 4; Kronz 1990, 425; Price 1996, 237). That is, in order for the hidden mechanism to work, it must correlate those factors that determine the experimenter’s choice with the hidden variables of the particles. But if the experimenter’s choice is determined, then it is not free, and conversely, since we have free will, the experimenter’s choice is not determined by earlier factors. However, all the commentators agree that an appeal to free will of this kind has no force against conspiracy theories. If free will is compatible with determinism, then the existence of earlier factors that determine the experimenter’s choice is no threat to her freedom. If, on the other hand, free will is not compatible with determinism, then the existence of free will would constitute an argument against all deterministic physical theories, including deterministic quantum theories like Bohm’s and deterministic classical theories like Newton’s. This is presumably not Bell’s point. In fact, I think that Bell’s objection to conspiracy theories has been misinterpreted, and has nothing much to do with free will.
Consider again Bell’s comment that the measuring devices can be set “at the whim of the experimenters”. The point of this comment, I think, is not that experimenters have free will in some metaphysically significant sense, but rather that we can set the measuring devices however we like. This reading gains support from a later presentation of the same argument, in which Bell notes that the settings could be determined “by apparently random radioactive devices, housed in separate boxes and thickly shielded, or by Swiss national lottery machines, or by elaborate computer programs, or by apparently free-willed experimental physicists” (1987, 154). Here there is a clear reference to free will, but it is evident from the context that the argument Bell intends to make has nothing to do with the nature of free will in particular, since Swiss national lottery machines could substitute for the free agents.
	But then what is Bell’s objection to conspiracy theories? It is that there are, as far as we know, no physical mechanisms that could correlate these disparate physical processes with the hidden variables of the particles. He concedes that “we cannot be sure that [the settings of the measuring devices] are not influenced by the same factors  that influence [the measurement results]”, but nevertheless describes such a hypothesis as “even more mind boggling than one in which causal chains go faster than light” (1987, 154). Presumably what is so mind boggling about the proposed mechanism is that it is able to cope equally well with all of the processes Bell lists. But mind-bogglingness is hardly a knockdown objection, especially if the comparison is with a non-local theory. The truth of a hidden-mechanism conspiracy theory would indeed be highly surprising, but that by itself doesn’t militate against the tenability of such a theory; on the other hand, we have prima facie evidence from special relativity that non-local theories are untenable.
Shimony, Horne and Clauser argue against conspiracy theories on the basis that the rejection of Independence results in a kind of skepticism, and that “skepticism of this sort will essentially dismiss all the results of scientific experimentation” (1976, 6). The idea is that we need to assume that the settings of our measuring devices are generally independent of the states of the systems they measure if we are to be able to rely on the results of experiment at all. In particular, one of the “settings” of any measuring device is whether it is to be applied to a given system, and the denial of the assumption that systems behave in the same way whether or not they are being measured surely leads to skepticism. For example, if the behavior of water is correlated with whether or not a thermometer is immersed in it, then we cannot after all conclude that water generally boils at 100C.
	However, there are various reasons to think that the consequences of adopting a conspiracy theory of quantum mechanics are not as dire as Shimony, Horne and Clauser make out. First, as Kronz points out, there is no reason to think that the hidden mechanism that underlies the conspiracy theory should not be amenable to perfectly ordinary experimental inquiry (1990, 427). Even though the hidden mechanism must be subtle enough that it has not been discovered to date, that is far from showing that its workings could not be uncovered. But if the mechanism can be uncovered, then we can take it into account in our dealings with measuring devices, and the threat of skepticism recedes. Second, the hidden mechanism required for a conspiracy theory of quantum mechanics, while quite broad in one sense, is quite narrow in another. That is, even though the conspiracy must involve anything that could conceivably be used to set the measuring devices in a Bell-type experiment, it need not correlate the setting of every measuring device with the state of the measured system. While a general violation of Independence might lead to skepticism, the violation involved in a conspiracy theory of quantum mechanics is quite narrowly circumscribed; we have indirect evidence that the statistical features of entangled states cannot be produced except by a conspiratorial mechanism, whereas we have no such evidence for other situations, and hence no reason to postulate a general violation of Independence.​[7]​ There is no reason to suspect that the boiling point of water depends on the presence or absence of a thermometer.
	The argument from skepticism is elaborated in a slightly different way by Price. Price notes that in order to cope with all the possible ways of setting the measuring devices, the hidden mechanism “would need to be something quite new: something so pervasive as to reduce the apparent causal order of the world to a kind of epiphenomenal shadow-play” (1996, 240). Again, the idea seems to be that to entertain such a theory is tantamount to embracing skepticism. But again, there is no reason to think that the real causal order underlying the apparent causal order should not be amenable to scientific discovery. Nor is there reason to think that the set of experiments that reveals this gap between the real and apparent causal order extends beyond the rather specialized realm of quantum entanglement experiments. Hence there is no reason to think that the skepticism involved in accepting a hidden-mechanism conspiracy is either broad in scope or insoluble in nature.
Kronz’s preferred argument against conspiracy theories rests on their complexity. He asks us to consider a procedure for setting the measuring devices such that the setting of one of the devices depends on the number of shares that change hands on the stock exchange in a fixed period of time (1990, 429). The period of time in question ends just before the particles reach the measuring devices, so that there is no way that the information collected by the setting procedure can reach both the particles without a superluminal signal. In such a case, how could the hidden variables for the particles fail to be independent of the settings of the measuring device? The number of shares that changes hand in the relevant period of time is the result of a huge number of apparently independent causal factors, including in principle everything in the backward light cone of the device-setting event. So in order for the conspiracy theory to defeat this procedure, the hidden mechanism would have to encompass every one of these factors. That is, the conspiracy would have to incorporate a mechanism that collects information from every causal precursor of every stockbroker’s behavior, correctly predicts the future number of trades in the relevant time period from all that information, and transmits the result (subluminally) to the particles. In other words, a hidden mechanism that could produce the right correlations in every conceivable situation would have to be baroque in the extreme.
Kronz argues that the complexity of an adequate conspiracy theory undermines its acceptability. He compares the conspiracy theory with a hidden-variable theory involving superluminal causation—say, Bohm’s theory. He concedes that the two theories may be identical in explanatory and predictive power, but argues that the superluminal theory has a pragmatic advantage, namely that the complexity of the conspiracy theory means that it is much easier to produce an explanation or a prediction using the superluminal theory. This is sufficient, he concludes, to prefer the simpler theory. All other things being equal, we prefer the theory that is easier to use.
But of course, all other things are not equal; the superluminal theory is arguably inconsistent with special relativity, whereas the conspiracy theory is not. If the choice is between a baroque theory and an inconsistency in science, it is far from clear which we should prefer. One might maintain, however, that the simplicity criterion is an absolute one, not a comparative one; the conspiracy theory is too complex to use, irrespective of comparisons with other theories. But the conspiracy theory makes exactly the same predictions as standard quantum mechanics, and standard quantum mechanics is not complicated to use. In other words, since the Bell correlations are encoded in the wavefunction, and the wavefunction can be used to generate any empirical prediction one might like, there is no need to use the hidden mechanism to generate predictions.
	Finally, Maudlin (1994, 63) argues that there is no way to construct an adequate local hidden-mechanism theory. Suppose, he argues, that we set the two measuring devices based on the properties of two incoming photons left over from the big bang. These photons remain outside the past light cone of S for the entire history of the universe. Hence in this case there can be no cause that lies in the common past of S, ML and MR, and a hidden-mechanism explanation of the Bell correlations is ruled out. But Maudlin assumes here that the each photon can act as the sole cause of the setting of its respective measuring device, and this is surely unrealistic. In order for the state of the photon to determine the setting of the measuring device, an apparatus must be in place to determine the state of the photon and to move the magnet in the measuring device accordingly. It is perfectly possible for events in the past light cone of S to affect this apparatus in such a way as to correlate the device settings with the particle properties. In other words, once we enter the realm of conspiracy theories, we cannot rule out the possibility that the hidden mechanism causes our attempts to set the measuring devices using the states of cosmic photons to systematically fail in Bell-type experiments.
6. A new argument against hidden mechanisms
	The existing arguments against hidden-mechanism conspiracy theories, then, are far from decisive. If hidden-mechanism conspiracy theories are to be ruled out as a solution to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics, a different kind of argument is needed. So let me suggest a new argument, namely that the proposed hidden-mechanism theory suffers from a variant of the measurement problem.​[8]​ Recall from section 2 that the measurement problem arises when a physical theory proposes that the dynamical behavior of a system depends on whether or not it undergoes a measurement. Since “measurement” is not a well-defined physical kind, there is no physical distinction between measurement processes and non-measurement processes that could trigger this difference in behavior. Hence any theory that requires such a distinction must be rejected.
But now note that in the case of the hidden mechanism, all that the various procedures for setting the measuring devices have in common is that they are used for setting the measuring devices; the physical processes themselves are widely disparate. Conversely, exactly similar processes frequently occur in contexts where they are not used to set measuring devices; lottery machines, for example, are not usually used to set the directions of spin-measuring devices in Bell-type experiments. Suppose that there is a human being and a lottery machine in the vicinity of a source of entangled particle pairs. For some particle pairs, the measuring devices are set by the human, and for others they are set by the machine. In the former cases, the hidden mechanism must correlate the properties of the brain but not the machine with the properties of the particles, and in the latter cases it must be the other way around. The hidden mechanism must be capable of correlating all and only the physical processes that will actually be involved in the setting of the measuring devices with the properties of the particles. But there is no physical description that picks out precisely those processes; a process that is involved in setting the measuring devices in one case may not be so involved in another.
The problem here is not simply the physical variety of device-setting processes. Recall that the standard collapse account suffers from the measurement problem not just because measurements are physically diverse, but because measurement plays a dynamical role in the theory. Similarly in the hidden-mechanism case, whether a process is involved in setting the measuring devices plays a dynamical role; the future evolution of the system depends on it. But since “processes that set measuring devices” is not a well-defined physical kind, the dynamics of the hidden-mechanism theory is ill-founded, just as the dynamics of the standard collapse account is ill-founded.
That hidden-mechanism theories suffer from a variant of the measurement problem may come as something of a surprise. After all, hidden-mechanism theories are hidden-variable theories, and hence have more in common with Bohm’s theory than with the standard collapse account. But this just shows that hidden variables alone are not sufficient to escape the measurement problem and its variants. Bohm’s theory does not suffer from the measurement problem because the dynamics by which the hidden variables evolve makes no reference to measurement, or to the setting of measuring devices for that matter. But the dynamics of hidden-mechanism theories must make such references if they are to provide a local account of the Bell correlations. Hence hidden-mechanism theories avoid the non-locality that afflicts Bohm’s theory at the cost of reintroducing the measurement problem.
There is no easy way round this difficulty. One might try to appeal to the existence of earlier physical properties that determine which processes will in fact set the measuring devices. Couldn’t the procedure by which the hidden mechanism determines what to correlate with the particle properties be couched in terms of these earlier properties, rather than in terms of future device-setting? But this suggestion misses the point. Just as there is no general physical characterization of the state of a system that determines whether it will be used to set a measuring device, so there is no general physical characterization of the causal precursors of that state that determines it either. No general physical characterization distinguishes those causal chains that end in the setting of measuring devices from those that don’t, except, of course, for their end-point. So no adequate algorithm for the hidden mechanism can be written, however complicated, unless it makes explicit reference to device-setting.
This new argument incorporates the insight of Bell and Kronz that the most suspicious feature of the hidden mechanism is that it works equally well whatever physical procedure is used to set the devices. However, unlike these prior arguments, the current argument does not attack the hidden-mechanism theory on methodological grounds—on grounds of simplicity or surprisingness—but rather on grounds of internal coherence. Hence the new argument is an improvement on previous arguments, in that its strength does not depend on the availability of viable alternatives to the hidden-mechanism conspiracy.
	There are good reasons, then, to reject hidden-mechanism conspiracies as a way of completing quantum mechanics. But this does not by itself rule out the basic strategy underlying conspiracy theories—namely the denial of Independence. In common with almost everyone who writes on the topic, I have assumed thus far that a hidden mechanism is the only way that a violation of Independence could arise. However, in the remainder of the paper I examine two alternative kinds of conspiracy theory, both of which violate Independence without appealing to a hidden mechanism.
7. Backwards-Causal Conspiracy Theories
The first alternative proposal for violating Independence I will consider is Price’s backwards-causal strategy.​[9]​ Price’s proposal is intended to provide a counterexample to the prevailing assumption that a violation of Independence requires the existence of a vast hidden mechanism. Price calls the hidden-mechanism view the common past hypothesis, and describes his own view as the common future hypothesis (1996, 238). That is, he suggests that the cause that induces correlations between the particles and the measuring device does not lie in the past as the particles approach the devices, but lies in the future. And this reduces the mystery considerably; the particles will, after all, interact with the measuring devices in the immediate future. Hence there is no need to postulate either a superluminal signal or a vast conspiratorial mechanism; the act of measurement itself acts as the cause, and the particles convey this cause to its effect at the particles’ source (Price 1996, 247).
Price’s idea is that the particles bear the “traces” of their future interactions. In particular, they bear the influence of the direction in which they are measured backwards in time to their source, and through this backwards-causal route the hidden variables of the particles become correlated with the future settings of the measuring devices. Note that the measurement event MR causally influences the particle production event S, but not the device setting event DR. Rather, DR affects MR which affects S. Hence the future event MR is not a common cause of DR and S in a strict sense, but nevertheless the common cause principle is satisfied, since the causal pathway via MR explains the correlation.​[10]​
	Most of the arguments considered in the previous section clearly don’t apply to a backwards-causal theory. There is no need for a vast hidden mechanism, so the arguments against the postulation of such mechanisms are beside the point here. Those arguments that do apply equally to both strategies, such as worries about free will and about skepticism, can be dealt with in exactly the same way for the backwards-causal strategy as for the hidden-mechanism strategy. So the only argument against hidden-mechanism theories that might be a threat to Price’s proposal is the new argument—that the theory suffers from the measurement problem.
Price’s theory is that something that occurs when the particles encounter the measuring devices acts as a cause of the hidden variables of the particles. If the proposal were that the cause is the act of measurement as such, then there would clearly be a problem. Whether or not the backwards-causal mechanism is triggered makes a difference to the earlier hidden variables of the particles; in other words, if measurement as such were the cause, then whether a measurement occurs would have a dynamical effect on the behavior of the system. But as stressed before, since there is no fundamental distinction between measurement processes and non-measurement processes, any theory that gives a dynamical role to measurement as such is ill-founded. Price is fully aware of the threat posed by the measurement problem to his theory, and stipulates that “it is a constraint on any satisfactory development of this strategy for quantum theory that the advanced effects it envisages be products of physical interactions in general, rather than products of some special class of measurement interactions” (1996, 249). Let us briefly investigate, then, whether this constraint can be satisfied.
	Recall that Bohm’s theory evades the measurement problem because it is not measurement as such that plays a dynamical role in the theory, but rather the motions of the particles during the measurement process; the motion of particle L directly and non-locally affects the motion of particle R. A hidden-mechanism conspiracy cannot avail itself of this solution, because the telltale motions of the particles occur after the hidden mechanism has done its work. But it looks like Price’s theory can avail itself of the Bohmian solution; even though the motions of the particles during measurement occur after the correlation has been established, backwards causation allows the particle motions to be a causal factor in producing the correlation. Again, the cause that explains the correlation is not the act of measurement as such, but the motions of the particles during the measurement process. The directions in which the two particles move under the influence of their respective magnetic fields is determined by the device settings, and the particles can bear the traces of this motion backwards in time to their common source, hence explaining the correlation between the particle properties and the device setting without any superluminal causation.
	But the causal explanation has to be handled carefully here, or it risks vacuity. According to the version of Price’s proposal currently under consideration, the device settings explain the motions of the particles, which in turn explain the hidden variables of the particles. But the hidden variables, presumably, themselves explain the motions of the particles on measurement; a particle moves upwards under the influence of a magnetic field precisely because its spin-value is “up”. The worry here is that the backwards-causal mechanism makes the causal explanation viciously circular; the particle moves up because it moves up.
	With care, though, it is possible to construct backwards-causal explanations of the Bell correlations that do not court vacuity. A straightforward way to do this is to distinguish between the axis along which the particles move, and whether they move up or down along that axis. The backwards-causal mechanism determines the axis alone; the settings of the measuring devices explain why each particle moves along a particular axis, but not why the particle moves up rather than down along its axis. The two particles carry the axis information backwards to their joint source, and this information enables some mechanism at the particle source to arrange the hidden variables for these two axes so as to satisfy the Bell correlations. But it is the mechanism at the source, whatever it may be, that provides the causal explanation for the actual values of the hidden variables, and hence for the actual motion of the particles, up or down, on measurement. This causal story avoids the circularity of the simpler story above. The fact that a given particle moves up rather than down on measurement is explained, as it should be, by the hidden variables of the particle, which are in turn explained by the process by which the particle is produced at the source. The fact that a given particle moves along this axis rather than some other, though, is explained, as it should be, by the setting of the measuring device, which is in turn explained by the procedure by which the device is set.
	Hence a backwards-causal conspiracy theory of the kind proposed by Price is not ruled out as a local explanation of the Bell correlations. Of course, this is not to say that such a theory can actually be formulated; there is no guarantee that a coherent dynamics for the hidden variables can be constructed along the lines of the sketch considered here. Indeed, the backwards causation alone raises numerous philosophical difficulties that would need to be overcome. However, given the dearth of viable alternatives, this is a research project that surely deserves attention.
8. Acausal conspiracy theories
Hidden-mechanism theories and backwards-causal theories are both strategies for constructing a local hidden-variable theory by violating Independence. The first of these postulates a mechanism that provides a cause in the past to explain the Bell correlations, and the second postulates a cause in the future. But there is a third strategy that is worth exploring here, namely that the common cause principle is false—that some correlations simply require no causal explanation.
	There is plenty of precedent for rejecting the common cause principle; see, for example, Arntzenius (2005) and references therein. In particular, the falsity  of the common cause principle has been suggested as the moral of Bell’s theorem before, notably by van Fraassen (1989) and by Fine (1989).​[11]​ Van Fraassen and Fine, though, do not advocate hidden-variable theories, but instead suggest that the standard quantum mechanics of physics textbooks is all we need, scientifically and philosophically (van Fraassen 1989, 113; Fine 1989, 193). If one is impressed by the problems outlined above in section 2, though, textbook quantum mechanics is clearly inadequate. If the wavefunction collapse in textbook physics is interpreted as a real physical process, then the measurement problem arises, and if it is not, then one needs an account of how determinate measurement results are generated. Hidden variables provide one such account.​[12]​
My suggestion, then, is that the arguments of van Fraassen and Fine can be appropriated into the context of a hidden-variable theory, since if the Bell correlations do not need a causal explanation at all, then it is not incumbent on a hidden-variable theory to provide one. The idea is that the hidden variables take care of the difficulties concerning the provenance of measurement results, and the van Fraassen-Fine arguments take care of worries about non-locality.
Let me flesh out this suggestion a little further. Fine argues that the demand for a causal explanation of the Bell inequalities is the product of unjustified a priori demands concerning what counts as an adequate explanation (1989, 192); van Fraassen concurs (1989, 110). Both Fine and van Fraassen argue that, given the constraints of locality, a causal explanation of the Bell correlations is simply unavailable. But both also take pains to argue that even in the absence of a causal explanation, the correlations are not mysterious (Fine 1989, 193–4; van Fraassen 1989, 108–9). After all, the correlations are predicted by a theory; they are entailed by the evolution of the wavefunction according to the dynamical laws of quantum mechanics. Hence the Bell correlations are explained, in the sense of being subsumed under a general law, but this explanation is not a causal one.
This line of argument can be adapted straightforwardly to the context of a hidden-variable theory. The basic idea is that the particle properties and the settings of the measuring devices are systematically correlated in Bell-type experiments, but not because of any interaction between them. The correlation is causally unexplained, but it is still lawlike, because it can be predicted on the basis of the wavefunction. The wavefunction, then, can be regarded as a global constraint on the hidden variables of quantum systems; in addition to obeying local causal laws, they must also obey the statistical relationships encoded in the wavefunction. Put another way, worlds in which the hidden variables do not satisfy the statistical constraints entailed by the wavefunction are not actual worlds. Again, there is an air of conspiracy about this arrangement; however, in this case it is not a causal conspiracy, but more like a preestablished harmony between causally separate pieces of the world.
Like the prior two strategies considered, this is merely a sketch of how a theory might be constructed. The sketch has not, as far as I know, been developed into a detailed theory.​[13]​ But as in the prior two cases, the sketch is enough to allow some preliminary evaluation of the strategy. As in the case of the backwards-causal case, most of the existing arguments against conspiracy theories do not apply to the acausal version, and for those arguments that do apply, the responses developed in section 5 are equally applicable here. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the measurement problem argument developed in section 6 has no force against an acausal conspiracy theory. Since there is no causal explanation of the Bell correlations, there is no need to worry about whether the causal explanation makes ineliminable reference to measurement. Instead of a causal explanation, there is a global constraint expressed by the wavefunction, but the evolution of the wavefunction over time is simply governed by the Schrödinger equation—there is no collapse dynamics—so there is no reference to measurement here either.
	So like backwards-causal theories, acausal theories provide a promising strategy for constructing a local hidden-variable account of quantum mechanics. But just as in the backwards-causal case, there are considerable philosophical obstacles to be overcome along the way. The common cause principle is deeply embedded in philosophy and in common sense, and is not to be given up lightly, even if it still holds in everyday situations. Furthermore, one might wonder whether the acausal strategy is really distinct from the backwards-causal strategy. The global constraint supports counterfactuals, for example between the settings of the measuring devices and the earlier determination of the hidden variables of the particles. Depending on one’s theory of causation, these counterfactuals might be interpreted as (backwards) causation between them. Clearly there is much work to be done in developing and comparing these two strategies.  
9. Conclusion
Bell’s theorem is sometimes taken as sounding the death-knell for hidden-variable theories of quantum mechanics. But Bell himself didn’t take it that way; he fully realized that its import was just that a hidden-variable theory must violate one of the assumptions of his theorem—Locality or Independence (1987, 154). Of course, given the fundamental nature of these assumptions, this is still a very significant result. Hidden-variable theories that violate Locality, such as Bohm’s theory, have been the subject of a huge amount of literature, but those that violate Independence, on the other hand, have been largely ignored. The perception seems to be that conspiracy theories are much more problematic than non-local theories. Ironically, though, while there is a straightforward argument against theories that violate Locality—namely that they contradict special relativity—the few existing arguments against violations of Independence are far from clear-cut.
	Nevertheless, even though the existing arguments are inconclusive, I have attempted to show that there are conclusive reasons to reject the most often discussed strategy for constructing a conspiracy theory of quantum mechanics. Commentators usually associate violations of Independence with the existence of a hidden mechanism, but hidden-mechanism conspiracy theories suffer from a measurement problem very like that which afflicts certain collapse theories of quantum mechanics, and are therefore untenable.
	If my argument is successful here, it might be thought that I have simply demonstrated what everyone already knows—namely that conspiracy theories are unworkable. But that would be premature, since my argument, too, rests on an assumption, namely the standard common cause principle. So my conclusion, properly speaking, is that a viable hidden-variable theory must violate this principle.
There are two ways one might loosen the requirements of the standard common cause principle. First, one might give up the demand that the explanatory cause lies in the past relative to the correlated events. This yields Price’s backwards-causal strategy, according to which the later settings of the measurement devices are part of the causal explanation of the earlier hidden variables of the particles. Second, one might give up the demand that correlated events require a causal explanation at all. This yields the acausal strategy, according to which the correlations between the device settings and the hidden variables are the product of a global constraint on histories of the world, rather than the product of a common cause. Both strategies are radical, since the standard common cause principle is taken for granted in much of contemporary metaphysics and epistemology. But this is certainly not the first time that philosophical investigation into the foundations of quantum mechanics has forced us to reevaluate our fundamental metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. Given the lack of less revolutionary alternatives, the conspiratorial route is surely still worth taking seriously.
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^1	  That is, hidden variable theories allow us to treat the probabilities delivered by the Born rule as reflecting our knowledge of possessed property values.  Other aspects of the quantum formalism—for example, interference between terms—do not lend themselves naturally to an epistemic interpretation.
^2	  Some authors use the phrase “the measurement problem” to refer to the inability of quantum mechanics without the collapse mechanism to deliver determinate measurement results—that is, they use the phrase to refer to the problem that the collapse mechanism was introduced to solve. This is perfectly intelligible, but it is not my usage.
^3	  Setting aside statistical considerations, Kochen and Specker (1967) show that it is impossible to assign values to all properties of a system without contradiction. However, the Kochen-Specker theorem assumes that the result of a measurement of a property is independent of how the measurement is performed, and all the hidden-variable theories considered below violate this assumption.
^4	  There are those who disagree (Stone 1994; Brown and Wallace 2004), but a response to these arguments is beyond the scope of this paper. 
^5	  That is, non-local theories presuppose a preferred frame in which to tell their causal stories, and special relativity insists that frames are purely conventional. Many commentators have pointed out that the superluminal influences in Bohm’s theory cannot be used to send a signal, or to identify the preferred frame; nevertheless, Bohm’s theory and special relativity cannot both be true. This is not to say that Bohm’s theory can be ruled out entirely; alternatively, one could give up one’s belief in the literal truth of special relativity, and treat it instrumentally instead (Albert 1992, 160). But a local hidden-variable theory would clearly be preferable, in that it does not require such radical revisions of our beliefs.
^6	  Since photons are not spin-1/2 particles, the details of the experimental arrangement are slightly different, but the principles involved are just the same. See Maudlin 1994, 6–28 for an exposition.
^7	  Still, a mechanism that applies only in the case of entangled states may be problematic for other reasons; this is discussed in section 6.
^8	  As I mention below, something like this argument may be implicit in some of the comments of Bell (1987, 154) and Kronz (1990, 429), but I do not think the argument has been explicitly stated.
^9	  A related strategy is suggested by Cramer (1986), but it is unclear whether it represents a genuine backwards-causal theory. Cramer notes that the backwards-causal elements of his theory are “only a pedagogical convention”, and that in fact “the process is atemporal” (1986, 661). This suggests that Cramer’s strategy is better interpreted as an acausal conspiracy theory (section 8).
^10	  Price takes the word “past” to be an essential element of the standard common cause principle, and hence sees himself as rejecting it (Price 1996, 118). However, since Price does not reject the assumption that a correlation requires a causal explanation, I take it that he would accept a version of the common cause principle stripped of its temporally asymmetric language.
^11	  Cartwright adopts a related position; the usual “screening off” condition typically associated with the common cause principle should be rejected, but the common cause principle itself may be retained, if understood in a suitably general way (1989, 243). However, she admits that this means of retaining a version of the common cause principle is not available for hidden-variable theories (1989, 237), or for any model in which causes propagate continuously through spacetime (1989, 247).
^12	  Again, this is not to say that the hidden-variable approach is the only potential solution to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics. The van Fraassen-Fine arguments may also be adaptable to some other approach.
^13	  Cramer’s (1986) transactional interpretation and Barrett’s (2005) frame-dependent constructions can possibly be interpreted as acausal conspiracy theories, although neither author describes their project in these terms. 
